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The modern prince, […] can only be an organism,  
a complex element of society in which a collective will, 
which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action,  
begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this  
organism, and it is the political party.1 
 
 
 
In this essay, I shall be indirectly reflecting on the labours of the present Labour Party in 
government by looking at another historical moment with which to compare and contrast. Mine 
will be a look out for the ‘benefits of hindsight’, or an ‘archaeological rewind’ to the 1970s in 
which the 'same' political party came to power.  
       In particular, I shall be focusing on the development discourse which underpinned the 
1970s administrations’ efforts to shift the national economy towards a sustained programme of 
industrialisation, and an increase of the tourism industry and services; an economic discourse 
which was often portrayed as enveloped ‘in a socialist nation’s journey towards freedom from 
colonial shackles.’ This decolonization effort, which often assumed mythical proportions, 
together with its contemporary critical portrayal of the development paradigm as a product of a 
new imperialism of a Eurocentric capitalist centre emerging from the peripheries, prompts me 
to seek insights within a post-colonial interpretative framework. My intentions come together 
well in Gregory Derek’s analysis of a contemporary optical shift from the modern focus on 
‘present futures’ to a post-structural notion of ‘present pasts’: 
 
[Postcolonialism’s] commitment to a future free of colonial power and disposition is 
sustained in part by a critique of the continuities between the colonial past and the 
colonial present. While they may be displaced, distorted, and (most often) denied, the 
capacities that inhere within the colonial past are routinely reaffirmed and reactivated in 
the colonial present.
2
  
 
       Thus, first I shall be exploring the historical context, both as a ‘post-colonial moment’ of a 
newly independent country in a world ideologically divided in two as well as the main 
narratives which re-present such a moment. In a second part, I shall retrace the paradigmatic 
continuity of development discourse which characterised the historical period under study, 
evaluating its significance at the time. Through the work of Mario Vella, Mario Brincat and 
others, I shall consider development as a capitalist project increasingly wrapped in socialist 
rhetoric. Rather than regarding such an uncomfortable partnership as an ideological dichotomy, 
with the expected paradoxes and contradictions, I shall be exploring the limits of these  
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discourses, to be on the lookout for horizons of possibilities, spaces for action and the 
unexpected. In the third part of the essay, having outlined the discursive spaces, I shall be 
considering the role of education in such a transitional moment which the 1970s represented. 
Owing to the limits of this essay, I shall be focusing on the comprehensivisation reform, 
locating it within dominant economic paradigms and the pressures to bring about social 
transformations.             
 
I : (post-) Context - ways of re-presentations  
 
There are two histories at work in the Wretched of the Earth: the 
Manichaean history of colonialism and decolonization embedded in 
text and context […] and a history of coercive ‘univocal choices’ 
imposed by the cold warriors […] on the rest of the world, which 
constitute the ideological conditions of its writing.
3
  
 
Homi Bhabha’s analysis of the different histories which underpin Fanon’s seminal work, the 
narratives of a decolonization process and the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War, also 
applies to the period I am focussing on. In the 1971 elections, Dom Mintoff’s Malta Labour 
Party [MLP]was voted to power after a period of thirteen years, which were characterized by 
the bitter conflict between the Maltese Catholic Church and the Malta Labour Party. 
Throughout this period, the Labour Party in opposition, though agreeing on independence as 
the political way forward, had been heavily criticising the terms and conditions which Borg 
Olivier’s Nationalist government had been negotiating with the British, describing them as 
‘fraudulent’4. Thus, in the 1970s the efforts to take Malta out of the colonial era were to be 
intensified by a Labour Government. Concurrently, though this particular decade was 
characterised by a period of détente, the Cold War between the Capitalist first world to the west 
of the ‘iron curtain’ and the Communist second world to its east, further dictated Malta’s 
peripheral geopolitics. To an extent, this characterised the Malta Labour Party’s ‘distinctly 
Third Worldist stand with an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement, close relations with 
China, a trade reciprocity agreement with the Soviet Union and a special relationship with 
Libya.’5 
       In his seminal essay, ‘When was the post-colonial?’ Stuart Hall identifies the ‘post-’ with a 
kind of rupture from a colonial past. Frantz Fanon’s considerations of the violent colonial 
experience, describing the dual worlds of the colonizer and the colonized, provide important 
insights: 
 
The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by 
barracks and police stations. […] It is neither the act of owning factories, nor estates, nor a 
bank balance which distinguishes the governing classes. The governing race is first and 
foremost those who come from elsewhere, those who are unlike the original inhabitants, 
"the others."  […] Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is 
not enough for the colonist to affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still better 
never existed in, the colonial world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he 
represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values.
6
 
  
According to Fanon, the rupture from such an experience is not the setting up ‘lines of 
communication […] between the two zones’, but necessarily entails ‘the abolition of one zone, 
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its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country.’7 He argues that the 
processes of independence and decolonization should be concerned with the creation of new 
identities, the ‘creation of new men’,8 who are not only challenging colonial rational viewpoints 
but passionately claim ‘that their world is fundamentally different.’9 Thus, for Stuart Hall:  
 
The ‘post-colonial’ signals the proliferation of histories and temporalities, the intrusion 
of difference and specificity into the generalising and Eurocentric post-Enlightenment 
grand narratives, the multiplicity of lateral and decentred cultural connections, 
movements and migrations which make up the world today, often bypassing the old 
metropolitan centres.
10
     
 
He eloquently revisits both his personal and collective experiences of colonization, and talks of 
the need to re-imagine and re-present the new identities:  
 
What they felt was I have no voice, I have no history, I have come from a place to which I 
cannot go back […] Against this sense of profound rupture, the metaphors of a new kind of 
imposed religion can be reworked, can become a language in which a certain kind of 
history is retold.
11
 
 
From this standpoint, the period understudy cannot be a linear, teleological journey from 
Independence to Republic Day and Freedom Day as many history books suggest. Despite its 
long history of being dominated by larger powers, Malta’s colonial legacies are often ignored. 
This warrants a confrontation between the representativeness of the period’s history and the 
facing of the colonial ghosts. What did the rupture from one’s colonial past signify to the 
people who inhabited such a past? Which continuities still marked the post-colonial?   
       Locally, any re-narration of new personal and collective identities seems conspicuous by its 
absence. Despite, admittedly, in the decades following independence, ‘labouring people’ kept 
alive their industrial experiences ‘by recollecting and transmitting memories of their work […] 
to their children, grandchildren and friends in the neighbourhood’12, the official and hegemonic 
historiography has been formed as a ‘flat one dimensional nationalistic perspective’ and is ‘still 
being written in such a totalising vista and is still generating the myth of a historically 
homogeneous Malteseness.’13  Such an essentialist and monolithic narrative can be interpreted 
in terms of what Paolo Freire describes as an anti-dialogic ‘cultural invasion’: 
 
All domination involves invasion […] a form of economic and cultural domination. 
Cultural conquest leads to the cultural inauthenticity of those who are invaded; they 
begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders. […] In 
cultural invasion it is essential that those who are invaded come to see their reality with 
the outlook of the invaders rather than their own; for the more they mimic the invaders, 
the more stable the position of the latter becomes.
14
 
 
At this stage, there are a number of reflections to be made. Isn’t the role of such a meta-
narrative in contradiction with the process of decolonization and the achievement of political 
freedom? What would the nationalist ‘Malta first and foremost’ signify in the light of such a 
process? Judith Butler deconstructs the nation-state by dissociating “the term state from the 
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term nation”.15 She sees the nation as “singular and homogeneous […] in order to comply with 
the requirements of the state”.16 In the context of Mintoff’s pragmatic socialism, as Alfred Sant 
describes it
17
, more reminiscent of the socialism of third-world leaders such as Nasser, Nehru, 
Ho Chi Minh in countries with similar colonial histories, and considering the almost non-
existence of an industrial working class which had catalyzed socialist action in western 
countries, Sant argues that nationalism encapsulated a movement of antagonism against the 
colonial powers.
18
 In this context, the ‘frontal chains of equivalence’ also serve to conflate all 
those belonging to ‘the nation’ into a logic of difference.19 However, as Fanon warns: 
 
If nationalism is not made explicit, if it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid 
transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into 
humanism, it leads up a blind alley. […]The collective building up of a destiny is the 
assumption of responsibility on the historical scale.
20
 
 
        Unfortunately, the staticity of the nationalist narrative, arguably typical of microstates 
which are rather reluctant in the letting go of the colonial experiences,
21
 has rarely sought the 
necessary deconstruction of often violent colonial identities, as explained by Stuart Hall above, 
and the necessary reconstruction of new identities. Thus, the pragmatic reading of the 
immediate necessities of the period of ‘rupture’ the Maltese people were inhabiting had to live-
up with such inherent contradictions: 
 
Labour’s rejoicing at the end of the colonial era seems to have precluded any reflections on 
the economics of neo-colonialism. This is surprising because in the 1960s the leaders of the 
non-aligned ex-colonies were greatly concerned with […] ‘an indirect and subtle form of 
domination’.22 
 
2: On the limits of discourses  
 
I am using ‘discourse’ in rather Foucaultian terms, as the process through which a space is 
created where ‘only certain things can be said and […] imagined’.23 In my reading inside the 
complexity of the period under study, I shall strive to follow Mario Vella’s methodological 
refutation of essentialist left/right dichotomies
24
, and his quotation from Laclau, namely 
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“ideological processes are ‘unintelligible so long as ideological elements are pre-assigned to 
essential paradigms”.25 Thus I shall focus on the limits of the different discourses, spaces which 
Derrida defined as ‘the episteme, functioning within a system of fundamental constraints, 
conceptual oppositions outside of which philosophy becomes impracticable’26, and thus subject 
to deconstruction. 
       In this section I shall be focusing on the discourses which characterised the political, social 
and economic local and international public spheres in the 1970s; namely the intensification of 
a capitalist developmental policy, mainly through a programme of late industrialisation 
financed by foreign investment and the equally intensified citation of the socialist ideology, 
within a discursive drive towards ‘decolonization’ and freedom.  
       Throughout this essay, I need to keep in mind Stuart Hall’s critique of a lack of 
convergence between the mostly cultural post-colonial analysis and the economic analysis of 
late capitalism which characterises similar studies: 
 
These two halves of the current debate about ‘late modernity’ – the post-colonial and the 
analysis of the new developments in global capitalism – have indeed largely proceeded in 
relative isolation from one another, and to their mutual cost.
27
 
 
 
2.1 : Inside/Outside Development 
 
There is an inevitable process leading from tradition to modernity. Follow it 
and you too can have all things we Americans have.28 
 
Development is a key characteristic of the modern era. Peet and Hartwick claim that ‘as an 
ideal concept, development comes from Enlightenment notions of the intervention of the 
modern, scientific, and democratic mind into the improvement of human existence.’29 This 
paradigm envisaged a ‘dual society’, a […] sector [which] is modern because of its exposure to 
the outside capitalist world. [The other sector is] ‘underdeveloped’ because it has lacked such 
exposure; but it can be modernized through the diffusion of ‘capital, institutions, values.”30  
       In addition, in a context of the dichotomic relations between a capitalist west and a 
communist east, the developmental paradigm was further articulated as a chain of equivalence, 
an ‘us and them’ standpoint, characterized by values that would essentialize its capitalist or 
socialist point of departure. Escobar argues that: 
 
[In the West] the discourse of communism, […] influenced the promotion of those choices 
which emphasized the role of the individual in society, and in particular, those 
approaches which relied on private initiative and private property. So much emphasis on 
this issue in the context of development, so strong a moralizing attitude, probably would 
not have existed without the persistent anti-communist preaching that originated in the 
Cold War.
31
  
 
Kay describes the underpinning rationale of this developmental theory as “[the abstraction of] 
the general features of developed societies […] as an ideal type and then contrasted with the 
equally ideal typical features of a poor economy and society. In this mode development is 
viewed as the transformation of one type into the other.”32 Thus, development discourse “was – 
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and continues to be for the most part – a top-down, ethnocentric and technocratic approach, 
which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be move up and 
down in the charts of ‘progress’”.33  
       Hence, in line with the Gramscian ‘every relationship of hegemony is necessarily a 
pedagogical relation’,34 within the development discourse: 
 
Everything was subjected to the eye of the […] experts: the poor dwellings of the rural 
masses, the vast agricultural fields, cities, households, factories, hospitals, schools, public 
offices, towns and regions and […] the world as a whole. […] Development proceeded by 
creating ‘abnormalities’ (such as the illiterate, the underdeveloped, the malnourished, 
small farmers or landless peasants) which it would later treat and reform.
35
 
 
In the early 1950s, the hegemony of such a paradigm was being consistently questioned by 
western, non-Marxist intellectuals such as Prebisch and the United Nations’ Economic 
Commission for Latin America started [problematizing] ‘the relationship between central and 
peripheral economies and attempted to explain what it saw as the functional nexus between the 
development of one and the underdevelopment of the other.’36 From a Marxist perspective, 
Frank went a step further in claiming that ‘underdevelopment is not due to the survival of 
archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage … [but] is generated by the very same 
historical process which also [generates] economic development: the development of capitalism 
itself’. Far from being separate, the modern and traditional sectors and areas are ‘fully […] 
integrated parts of the imperialist system’.37 
       Following this brief outline of the development paradigm and its main critiques, I shall be 
exploring how it permeated the Maltese public sphere. Under British rule, the local economy 
was restructured so a to depend heavily on the military needs of the ‘mother country’. Thus, in 
many ways, Malta’s dependence proved to be not only political but even more so socio-
economical. This monolithic ‘fortress economy’ was characterised by periods of relative 
prosperity, especially in periods of war and instability in the Mediterranean,  followed by 
periods of decline in the standard of living during periods of relative peace. The only major 
industry which continued to develop locally in the shadows of British military needs was ship 
repair.  
       Thus, a post-colonial leader
38
 of a peripheral country needed to seek independence which 
wasn’t solely political but also economic. The question here would be, what kind of 
relationship with the centre(s) of the economic world, (which in most cases happened to be the 
same colonizers which had granted these countries their independence) would such country 
‘choose’ to have?  
       In an important essay,
39
 Mario Vella traces historically the build-up of a dominant 
paradigm of export-led industrial development in post-war Malta. Different from other reports 
on development which had been previously been commissioned by Colonial and Maltese 
governments, the Balogh-Seers Report of 1955 proved to be an important turning point in this 
regard. The authors mainly argued for ‘the necessity of industrial activity [the creation of 
wealth rather than its handling], the need to free the Maltese economy from its dependence on 
British military spending, necessity of foreign industrial investment, the need for wages to be 
lower in Malta than in countries from which investment is expected.’40 Balogh and Seers were 
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interested in overcoming the difficulties in integrating the economy with that of the former 
mother country’ since economic reliance on foreign firms, especially British ones, different 
from reliance on British military spending was in some way not seen as dependence.
41
 These 
premises proved to be important underpinnings which led to the general acceptance, even by 
opposing social blocs,
42
 of a development paradigm, articulated in the five/seven year plans 
which characterised economic planning under different governments between the mid 1950s 
and the 1980s. This development was based mainly on two assumptions: capitalist development 
is the only sort of development and if this development is to be an industrial one it must be 
export-led and based mainly on wholly or partially foreign-owned enterprise.
43
  
       How did the Labour Government of the 1970s relate with such a developmental strategy? 
Despite what one might assume if one interprets the Labour policy from an ideological 
left/right dichotomy, the Labour Party never really questioned the orthodoxy of capitalist 
developmental concepts. Vella describes the Labour Government’s vision of development as 
‘quasi-orthodox vision of development – between the ‘classical’ and the ‘Keynesian’ world 
economic views and quite compatible with Rostowian ‘stages’ scheme.’44 He argues that: 
 
In the absence of a progressive national bourgeoisie able and willing to promote 
industrial development, and because the Nationalist Party was dominated by the interests 
of a merchant capital uninterested in if not downright opposed to industrialization, the 
task of promoting capitalist industrialization had to be taken up by the Labour 
Movement.
45
 
 
In support of such an active economic role of the State, Brincat suggests that between 1971 and 
1987, the Maltese state saw itself as a Developmental State
46
. He argues that while in the first 
three economic plans the state saw its role as ‘regulatory’, the development plans which were 
published by the Labour Government in this period, ‘treat politics and economic as two sides to 
the same coin, and the state as an economic actor that must behave as such, not only responding 
to markets but also shaping them’.47  
 
2.2 : Inside/Outside Maltese Socialism 
 
In what follows, I shall be briefly exploring the other ubiquitous discourse which increasing 
characterised the public sphere in the 1970s, socialism. A quick exercise
48
 which goes through 
the Malta Labour Party’s electoral manifestos of 1971, 1976 and 198149, which somehow 
bracket the historical period I am dealing with, shows that there is a shift in the emphasis and 
use of particular words (and discourses). In the manifesto of 1971, the words which appear 
more frequently besides ‘government’ are ‘Labour’, ‘Malta’, ‘Maltese’, ‘Country’ and ‘people’. 
This seems to be in line with the need of nationalistic discourse, as discussed earlier on, which 
creates the necessary antagonism between the colonizer and the colonized. In the manifestos of 
1976 and 1981, while still retaining the nationalistic element, there is a marked shift towards 
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the use of a socialist rhetoric. In 1976, the words most used were ‘Maltese’, ‘Malta’, ‘Socialist’, 
‘People’, ‘Work’ and ‘Labour’ while in 1981, the words were ‘Maltese’, ‘Socialist’, ‘Workers’, 
‘Country’, ‘Malta’, ‘Labour’. Of course, such key words warrant further unpacking.                  
        In what follows, I shall be briefly tracking the metamorphosis of the socialist discourse in 
the mentioned manifestos. In the 1971 Manifesto, the nodal point seems to be progress, which 
is articulated both as the reversing back of the bad effects of the previous two Nationalist 
Governments, strengthening the economy by increasing the productivity and reducing the 
national debt. The word ‘socialist’ is only mentioned once, when towards the end of the 
manifesto, the Labour Party’s guiding beliefs are laid out in four basic points:  
A Labour Government, in the implementations of this programme and in the measures 
necessary for the good of the people of Malta and Gozo will act on these democratic 
socialist beliefs: 
1. that each citizen has equal rights, irrespective of race, creed and beliefs. 
2. that each citizen has the right to follow his religious beliefs without hindrance. 
3. that the duty of a civilised society is that it should not allow excess suffering for man 
through a huge disequilibrium between the rich and the poor. 
4. that man in a modern society should create conditions under which it will be more 
possible to live like brothers, in one family instead of like animals in a forest.
50
 
 
Such an ideological statement seems devoid of any contextualisation. Socialism is carefully 
distanced from any notion of antagonism or class conflict. Despite its assumed decolonization 
project encapsulated in the efforts to gain economic independence through development, such a 
document lacks any analysis of imperialistic, neo-colonial dependence.  
       After five years of the Malta Labour Party in Government, in the 1976 Manifesto the 
Socialist ideology is more carefully articulated and contextualised within the different leftist 
ideologies which respond to different realities: ‘in the history of certain countries where 
ignorance and cruelty prevailed.’ The ‘Maltese Socialist Movement’ is articulated as some form 
of an egalitarian project which would grant all citizens the same rights: 
 
Under Democratic Socialism the workers united together declare that they are prepared 
to give these same rights which they had achieved after so many hardships and sacrifices, 
even to those who only very recently were in power and with the utmost cruelty had 
denied them these very same rights.
51
 
 
       A substantial part of the Manifesto’s introduction is dedicated to a historical, quasi-
mythical rendition of the achievements attributed to Maltese Socialism, starting by the 
introduction of rent regulation (so that the Maltese worker (“so as to ensure a home for the 
Maltese worker”), the privileging of the Maltese language (“so that everybody can understand 
what’s going on”), to the introduction of income tax (“so that those with higher incomes can 
contribute more than those with lower incomes”), the introduction of social benefits, and so on. 
In this narrative, the efforts of the Maltese Workers’ Movement were crowned when Malta 
became a republic: 
The Republic removed privileges and in their stead instilled amongst us work, tolerance, 
education, social justice and charity. The Republic which we set up together gave the 
right of freedom of expression, of freedom of conscience, of peaceful co-existence, 
equally, to all the Maltese, even to those who in the past did their utmost so that this 
would not come about.
52
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The ‘Maltese’ becomes an articulation of a logic of difference in which antagonisms such as 
ruling classes, religious indoctrination and the capitalist jungle are pushed to the sides, at times 
being depicted as 'non-Maltese' aspects. The merging of nationalism with socialism is actually 
articulated as ‘everybody is a worker’ (which to an extent eclipses the concept of class struggle 
which forms part of the socialist/Marxist reading of social relations): 
To this movement a worker means any man who in some way or other contributes 
towards the social, material, intellectual and moral welfare of his fellowmen. In the eyes 
of Maltese Socialism a Judge in the Law Courts is as much a worker as the blacksmith in 
the dockyard, the artist as much as the fishmonger, the doctor as much as the mason, etc., 
etc. 
The 1981 Manifesto, is more or less a continuation of this nationalist-socialist rhetoric but is 
more often accompanied by the figure of the worker and the Workers’ Movement which 
“derives its strength from the union among workers who uphold the same beliefs and who wish 
to live free from any bondage and in a democratic environment, founded on principles of social 
justice.” The abstract ‘socialist beliefs’ are once again articulated in the following points: 
 
- our country will remain an island of peace, free from all political and military 
affiliations; 
- we will increase still further the levels of economic activity in order to continue to 
improve the living standards of the Maltese people; 
- the material wealth which we will create will be distributed according to the principles 
of social justice; 
- fundamental human rights and liberties will be respected; and 
- all the Maltese people will be given equal opportunities in life. 
 
 
 2.3 : At the crossroads 
 
There are a number of questions which emerge from the co-existence of a seemingly structural 
capitalist developmental project and a very visible socialist rhetoric. Why would such a 
persistent socialist self-projection (and self-perception) emerge so much more clearly at a 
second stage of Labour’s period in government? Were Labour’s social and economic reforms 
such as the separation between Church and State, the nationalisation of banks and other 
companies which provided for the economic infrastructure of the country and the progressive 
increase in wages, inspired by a socialist ideology or seen as necessary for the success of 
capitalist development through a programme of industrialisation? Sammy Meilaq, a dockyard 
worker, chairperson of the Malta Drydock’s council when it was managed by the workers 
themselves and an important organic intellectual hailing from the working class seems to opt 
for the former explanation: 
 
Socialism can only be constructed over a period of time in a series of progressive phases, 
rather than in one ‘magical’ moment. […] In Malta’s case, during the 1970s, economic 
development happened thanks to a mix of government and private enterprise. […] In a few 
years, from a colonized people, we had become owners, and we were controlling vital 
aspects of the economy, including the banks, energy, telecommunications, the airline and 
others.
53
  
 
Yet, despite such socialist idealism, the development project in Malta was no socialist ‘Great 
Leap Forward’.54 Notwithstanding alternative models of development such as Cuba’s effort to 
base its development on south-south solidarity.
55
 the Maltese model of development was clearly 
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a capitalist project. Grech even questions the prevalent description of the economy as run by the 
Mintoff Administration as a mixed economy in which the ‘vital’ areas belonged to the people 
and the other ‘less vital’ areas run by private enterprise as he argues that the country could not 
be run without the latter ‘less vital’ areas.56   Towards the end of the 1970s, Mario Vella had 
already sifted through the socialist rhetoric which was prevalent at the time and interpreted the 
government’s effort as a ‘Maltese mode’ of dependent capitalist development:   
 
a model similar […] to the Brazilian model that emerged in 1964. This model requires 
the separation of the labour market and the foreign market. The local market (dominated 
by a policy of low wages) is supplied via traditional industries not usually of interest to 
foreign capital. The foreign market is supplied by almost exclusively foreign capital 
which is interested in the country concerned because of low wages which in their turn 
remain low because of the low cost of living.
57
 
 
In different academic papers which spanned over different decades, Mario Vella kept 
deconstructing this post-colonial moment from different perspectives, including the 
colonizer/colonized perspective of development, the Malta Labour Party’s ideological 
balancing acts, the role and extent of the Malta’s late industrialization process and the 
clerical/non-clerical intellectual’s ignoring of such process. He mainly contextualizes his 
arguments in a Gramscian perspective of a struggle between opposing social blocs, which were 
often led by different sections of the Maltese bourgeoisie.
58
 Vella identifies the promotion by 
the MLP of a “‘progressive’ historic social bloc cemented together by a national-populist 
ideology, presented as a non-communist but progressive corporatism, presided over by a 
paternalistic and caring state.”59 Such a social bloc, which made up the backbone of the Labour 
Party, was held together by its antagonism to the more ‘conservative’ bloc, which thus served to 
essentialize its own identity. It was dominated by the interests of manufacturing capital but 
numerically supported by Dockyard workers and the industrial employees of the public sector.
60
  
       This brings me to note some aporetic tension between Vella’s different readings of the 
historical moment under study. In his 1994 paper, Vella argues that between 1971 and 1987, 
“the Labour Government is clearly caught between the pressing need to provide a decent 
standard of living to the people as well as to secure the fullest possible employment on the one 
hand and the need to attract export-oriented industrial investment on the other”.61 Then, in his 
2009 paper, Vella provides a more radical reading: 
 
Old Labour under Mintoff [was] a populist party for whom socialist rhetoric was 
necessary to co-opt and mobilize the working class for the development of capitalism, 
specifically for a development programme driven by export-oriented foreign direct 
investment, one typical of late industrialising peripheral economies [which] often 
resulted in stunted dependent development.
62
  
 
Though the two discourses are not in binary opposition, they provided spaces for comparison. 
The first reading is a more hopeful analysis of a Labour Party caught in the contradictions of 
having to deal with colonial legacies while embracing the economic paradigms of the economic 
centre, yet still struggling to keep a focus on the categories of people who were the victims of 
an unjust distribution of wealth, of lack of recognition and representation, with the aim of 
bettering their condition. The second is a bleaker, apparently determined reading in which 
socialism sounds much like a simulacrum, with no spaces for collective action. Here the party is 
no modern prince.  
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I would like to hang on to this interpretative tension between these two discourses in order to 
locate the place of education. 
 
3 : On discursive Tensions and Open Identities 
 
We are now in the process of reforming […] education so that we can 
increase the number and the efficiency of our middle management, engineers 
and so on.63 
 
Sultana argues that, ‘[education’s] form, content, delivery, assessment and duration, the 
language of instruction that is adopted, the pedagogical modes that are preferred, the 
relationship between certification and the employment market […] are all dependent on which 
group succeeds in establishing its agendas and generally enforcing these on other groups.’64  
       Following the deconstruction of the local tense relationship between ideological rhetoric 
and deterministic conceptualisation of development in a post-colonial milieu, such a 
perspective may contribute to the stepping away from the dichotomic position between two 
extremes typical of a colonial frame of mind and the opening up the diverse public spheres in 
which such struggles take place. In his ‘Discourse Theory’, Laclau, in stating that “no identity 
is closed in itself but is submitted to constant displacements in terms of chains of equivalence 
and differences combinations and substitutions”65 implies that such struggles are part and parcel 
of a continuous identity formation of the different social relations. This may provide better 
insights in the complexity of such situations.  
       Thus, in this latter section of the essay, I shall briefly revisit the role of ‘education as 
struggle’ as articulated in one of the first major reforms which was spearheaded by the Labour 
Government, the Comprehensivisation of schools. I chose to focus on this particular reform, 
instead of other important reforms which characterised this period, such as the intensification of 
vocational education and the worker-student scheme for a number of reasons.
66
 
       I shall first look at the discourses on which such a reform was constructed. Which voids in 
the ‘bleak present’67 was such a reform addressing? Which antagonisms was this reform 
engaging with? Was it trying to transform a chain of equivalence (us versus them) in a logic of 
difference (it is us, and an insignificant them)? In the following excerpt from the MLP’s 
manifesto of 1971, one may get an idea:  
The Nationalist Party came to power through undemocratic means. Even though it had 
huge funds to dispose of, the Nationalist Government failed in its aim to make our 
country viable through its own earnings and resources, without the need for foreign aid. 
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And as it failed to reach this aim, it also failed in its other aim, that of obtaining for 
Malta that state of independence achieved by other nations of our size.
68
 
I shall delve deeper into this from the perspectives of the two discursive routes which I tackled 
in the second part of this essay: capitalist programme of late industrial development and 
socialist transformation.  
       A dominant discourse which at the time was characterising development economics, the 
Human Capital Theory,
69
 stated that there is a direct relationship between investment in 
education (usually measured as years of schooling) and the productivity of workers (both on the 
workers’ income and in their countries’ economic growth).70 Sultana locates such a discourse in 
the efforts of the main capitalist institutions which were orchestrating the developmentalist 
paradigm at the economic centre of a global world system: 
 
The view that education was the solution to economic difficulties was being pushed by 
influential international agencies such as UNESCO, the International Labour Office and 
the World Bank.
71
  
 
Thus ‘education for all’72 was the nodal point which underpinned the educational reforms of 
this era and thus such a notion became an arena where to determine whose interest were 
prevailing. Conservative agendas could be observed at work on a macro scale within the 
international institutions which pushed the ‘education for all/education as the solution’ agendas. 
In the World Bank strategy under the McNamara administration, the development paradigm 
started being accompanied by pro-poor discourses and measures such as the creation of the 
International Development Association, which were meant to seriously challenge the 
communist ownership of social justice discourses. This explains some of the apparent overlaps 
of conservative and progressive discourses.
73
 On a local level, the ‘Secondary Education for 
All’ reform was discussed and implemented by the previous Nationalist administration, which 
had the interests of the mercantilist capital at its backbone, yet a mainly selective system was 
retained.
74
 Also, judging by the way Labour’s comprehensive schools reform was undermined 
by exponents of the conservative bloc, such as teachers and particular newspapers
75
, evidences 
the weaknesses of hegemonic hold which the progressive bloc had on society. This can be also 
be observed in the relatively sheepish attitude with which the Labour Party and the education 
authorities introduced the reforms and how they started slowly retreating from the very 
beginning by allowing Private Schools, allowing partial selection, by the removal of the 
Minister of Education responsible for its ideation and its implementation, and finally its total 
scrappage just before the 1981 election. 
       In such a scenario of a conservative domination over meanings in the education field, the 
implementation of the comprehensive schooling model as an interpretation by the Labour Party 
of the ‘education for all’ paradigm, must have stemmed, at least in part, from the different 
beliefs which set apart the Labour Party from the Nationalist Party. Peter Mayo, apart from the 
centrality given to the education-production nexus (contributing to the country’s development), 
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the push towards transformative action, the importance of the communal and collective 
dimensions of learning, the prominence to social sciences, identifies the widening of access to 
education at all levels for underprivileged groups and the dismantling of structures that are 
perceived to contribute to the reproduction of privileges as important characteristics of socialist 
education.
76
 This explains why countries, with important leftist political traditions, such as 
Sweden, Norway, France and Great Britain, between 1960 and 1980 ‘went Comprehensive.’77 
       Thus, it is significant to go again through minister Agatha Barbara’s discourse which she 
was making at the time. As she explains the aims of such reforms, she weaves, in an apparently 
seamless fashion, all the tensions which occur at the crossroads of capitalist development and 
the implementation of the socialist egalitarian project:  
 
to provide everybody with the same opportunities in education; to improve the status of 
manual workers, at the same time increasing the personal competence of the individual 
and his awareness of his contribution towards the country's development; to foster 
encouragement so that Malta attains economic independence; to alter the Maltese 
educational system from one based on the English system to one designed to meet Malta's 
needs and at the same time compatible with the system obtaining in Western Europe; to 
nurture among the Maltese and Gozitans freedom of thought and a sense of responsibility 
of the individual.
78
 
 
Zammit Marmarà interprets this comprehensivation reform as the MLP’s particular articulation 
of what Carnoy and Samoff term as the ‘transition state’, a state which is actively trying to 
challenge the traditional pillars on which the country depended:  
 
The educational systems of transition states are thus much more important in shaping 
ideology than was the educational system of the conditioned capitalist state it replaced… 
Through education […] the state attempts to give a new meaning to citizenship, one that 
is largely political and socio-collective rather than economic and individualistic.
79
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
From such an exposition, it is difficult to determine whether Gramsci’s account of the Modern 
Prince, the collective will which asserted itself in action, was correct. It is still not clear what 
role may the political party assume when it accepts the different tensions resulting from the 
different paradigms and interests it has to manage.  
       What may have been a worthwhile exercise in challenging my own assumptions was the 
self-imposed distancing both from the common-sense left/right methodological essentialisms 
and monolithic nationalistic historical narratives. Such a standpoint helped the unleashing of the 
complexities on the unsuspecting author!   
 
                                                 
76
  P.Mayo, ‘The Worker Student Scheme 1978-1987’: Consistencies and Contradictions in 
Labour’s Socialist Policies,’ in J. Chircop,  ed., Revisiting Labour History  (Malta, 2012), 371 – 374. 
77
  Zammit Marmarà, 254. 
78
  Times of Malta 12 Dec. 1972, as quoted in R.G. Sultana, ‘Education and Social Transition: 
Vocationalism, Ideology and the problems of Development,’ International Review of Education, Vol. 41, 
no. 3-4 (1995), 202. 
79
  Carnoy and Samoff as quoted in Zammit Marmarà, 259. 
